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Impact of uncertain CCS deployment on EU climate negotiations
Context
The facts:
Climate policy is one of the corner stones of European Union (EU)
policy
European Commission has defined a roadmap with an objective of
80% GHG reduction in 2050 compared to 1990 levels
Carbon Capture and Sequestration technologies are considered as
potential backstop technologies (up to 14% of total abatements
according to IEA)
CCS deployment is highly uncertain with technical, social and
legislative issues
Questions:
1 How to share the burden of the GHG target? How to design a fair
agreement among EU countries?
2 How each country will use its allocations on the horizon 2020-2050?
What will be the associated costs for each country?
3 What impacts of CCS uncertainty on such agreements?
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A noncooperative dynamic game
Assumptions:
1 A safety emissions budget Bud is distributed among the players. Let θj ∈ (0, 1)
be the share of player j , with
∑m
j=1 θj = 1.
2 A competitive market for emissions permits, which clears at each period. Let
ωtj be the vector of permits for country j at period t.
3 CCS penetration. We denote ccstj the amount of emissions of country j
sequestered at period t at cost C t and ccstj the upper bound for sequestration
for country j at period t.
Model: Then we consider the game where each player j controls the permit
allocations schedule (ωtj : t = 0, . . . ,T − 1) with Ωt =
∑m
j=1 ω
t
j and tries to achieve
max
ωj ,ccsj≤ccs j
{
T−1∑
t=0
βtj (pi
t
j (e
t
j (Ω
t)) + pt(Ωt)(ωtj − etj (Ωt) + ccstj )− C tccstj
}
,
subject to actions chosen by the other players and under the budget sharing constraint
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj ≤ θjBud. (1)
Here pitj (e
t
j ) represents the economic benefits obtained from emissions by country j , at
time t.
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Numerical implementation
Total emissions budget on 2020-2050, Bud=99 Gt CO2
−pitj (etj ) are abatement cost function estimated from 200 runs of the CGE
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ccstj are based on CO2 storage capacity and emissions from electricity generation,
the CCS penetration rate is assumed to be linear between 2030 and 2050
The cost of CCS is 110 $/tCO2 and half of emissions from electricity generation
can be sequestered in 2050
Discount rate, βj = 5%
Allocation shares θj are based on the following rules:
Sovereignty - Allocations are proportional to emissions in 2010
Ability to pay - Abatements are proportional to GDP in 2010
Egalitarian - Allocations are proportional to population in 2010
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Nash equilibrium: deterministic case
Cumulative discounted welfare losses (in % of cumulative discounted household
consumption)
Sovereignty Ability Egalitarian
Austria 0.36 2.57 0.92
Belgium 0.82 1.56 2.83
Bulgaria -7.74 -18.17 -14.09
Cyprus 9.67 -4.91 9.67
Czech Republic -11.29 -16.54 -4.70
Germany -1.60 1.12 -0.18
Denmark 1.66 -1.18 2.35
Estonia -2.16 -11.66 6.92
Finland 0.34 0.81 2.81
France 1.68 2.72 0.52
Great Britain 1.16 1.03 1.39
Greece 7.08 -8.19 7.08
Croatia 5.90 0.54 0.17
Hungary 0.42 -0.72 -3.69
Ireland 2.27 0.19 2.76
Italy 1.24 2.28 0.65
Latvia 3.78 -1.06 -2.32
Lithuania -1.61 -1.62 -5.75
Luxembourg 5.14 -1.28 9.03
Malta 4.66 -1.07 4.66
Netherlands -1.10 0.88 1.65
Poland -3.59 -11.13 -1.80
Portugal 1.12 0.35 -1.87
Romania 0.02 -3.92 -10.47
Spain 1.76 0.18 0.47
Slovak Republic -0.84 -2.98 -1.93
Slovenia 1.85 0.12 1.85
Sweden 2.27 5.00 1.08
EU-28 0.59 0.59 0.59
Impact of uncertain CCS deployment on EU climate negotiations
Nash equilibrium: deterministic case
Cumulative discounted welfare losses (in % of cumulative discounted household
consumption)
Sovereignty Ability Egalitarian Fair
Austria 0.36 2.57 0.92 0.50
Belgium 0.82 1.56 2.83 0.48
Bulgaria -7.74 -18.17 -14.09 0.60
Cyprus 9.67 -4.91 9.67 0.54
Czech Republic -11.29 -16.54 -4.70 0.55
Germany -1.60 1.12 -0.18 0.63
Denmark 1.66 -1.18 2.35 0.56
Estonia -2.16 -11.66 6.92 0.55
Finland 0.34 0.81 2.81 0.59
France 1.68 2.72 0.52 0.63
Great Britain 1.16 1.03 1.39 0.61
Greece 7.08 -8.19 7.08 0.52
Croatia 5.90 0.54 0.17 0.59
Hungary 0.42 -0.72 -3.69 0.53
Ireland 2.27 0.19 2.76 0.53
Italy 1.24 2.28 0.65 0.61
Latvia 3.78 -1.06 -2.32 0.52
Lithuania -1.61 -1.62 -5.75 0.47
Luxembourg 5.14 -1.28 9.03 0.49
Malta 4.66 -1.07 4.66 0.55
Netherlands -1.10 0.88 1.65 0.58
Poland -3.59 -11.13 -1.80 0.58
Portugal 1.12 0.35 -1.87 0.56
Romania 0.02 -3.92 -10.47 0.50
Spain 1.76 0.18 0.47 0.57
Slovak Republic -0.84 -2.98 -1.93 0.47
Slovenia 1.85 0.12 1.85 0.41
Sweden 2.27 5.00 1.08 0.60
EU-28 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59
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EU burden sharing in % Fair solution
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
G
B R
D E
U
F R
A
I T
A
S P
N
P O
L
G
R C N
L D B E
L
S W
E
R O
U
A U
T
F I
N
D N
K
P O
R
I R
L
C Z
E
H U
N
S V
K
H R
V
B G
R
L U
X
S V
N
E S
T
C Y
P
L A
T
L I
T
M
L T
Top 10=82%
Impact of uncertain CCS deployment on EU climate negotiations
Stochastic analysis on CCS deployment
We define three contrasted scenarios of CCS deployment
Optimistic: The cost of CCS is 55 $/tCO2 and CCS technologies
are expected to sequester all emissions from gas and coal power
plants in 2050.
Pessimistic: The cost of CCS is 165 $/tCO2 and CCS technologies
are expected to sequester quarter of emissions from gas and coal
power plants in 2050.
Medium: Figures = deterministic case
2020 2030 2040 2050
Optimistic scenario (1/3)
Medium scenario (1/3)
Pessimistic scenario (1/3)
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An S-adapted non-coooperative game
The payoff of player j in an S-adapted equilibrium satisfies :
max
ωj
∑
t<t¯
(βtj (pi
t
j (e
t
j (Ω
t)) + pt(Ωt)(ωtj − etj (Ωt)))+ (2a)
∑
s∈S
P(s)
∑
t≥t¯
(βtj (pi
t
j (e
t
j (Ω
t , s)) + pt(Ωt , s)(ωtj (s)− etj (Ωt , s) + (2b)
utj (Ω
t , s))− C tj (utj (Ωt , s)))
}
, (2c)
subject to actions chosen by the other players and under the budget sharing constraint∑
t<t¯
ωtj +
∑
t≥t¯
ωtj (s) ≤ θjBud, ∀s ∈ S. (3)
and CCS capacity constraints
0 ≤ utj (Ωt , s) ≤ etj (Ωt , s), ∀t ≥ t¯, ∀s ∈ S . (4)
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European emissions profile
Deterministic case
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Figure: Emissions profile (in MtCO2)
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European emissions profile
Deterministic case versus without CCS
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Figure: Emissions profile (in MtCO2)
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European emissions profile
Deterministic case versus stochastic case
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Figure: Emissions profile (in MtCO2)
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EU Welfare cost and CO2 sequestered
CO2 price Cumulative CO2 sequestered in
$ welfare loss Gt CO2 % of
in 2050 in % abatement
Deterministic case
Without CCS 1103 1.2 – –
With CCS 847 0.6 11.0 15%
Stochastic case
Pessimistic 991 0.9 5.5 7%
Medium 761 0.6 11.1 15%
Optimistic 440 0.1 21.4 29%
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Conclusion
It is possible to design an agreement that equalizes welfare costs
between the 28 EU member states
The implementation of an EU tradable permits market is crucial as
it allows to equalize marginal abatement costs
The negotiations of the next burden sharing will become more
complex and more challenging within 28 diverse Member States
CCS deployment has a significant impact and its uncertainty has to
be considered
Postponement strategy for CO2 abatement that we find within the
deterministic scenario is no longer optimal in the stochastic case
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Questions ??
Thank you for your attention ...
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